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Nation and the
in Paul

Myth

of Origin

Tillich’s

Radical Social Thought^
A. James Reimer
Assistant Professor of Historical Theology,
College, University of Waterloo

Conrad Grebel

The

Issue

The question this essay addresses is quite simply the following one: to what extent are the dynamic cultural and historical
such as nature,
ingredients of the so-called “myth of origin”

—

soil,

blood, family, tribe, and nation

characteristics of

what

it

means

—

to be

to be affirmed and incorporated into

positive and defining

human

and, therefore,

any vision of

social jus-

even on the political left? To put the question differently,
in more Tillichian language, how important is the “whence”
tice

or “wherefrom” of human existence, sometimes referred to as
the “isness” of being, in relation to the “whither” or “whereto”
(oughtness) of existence? Ever since the triumph and demise of
National Socialism in the 1930s and 1940s, with its accompanying atrocities, many have equated nationalism with bigotry
and injustice. Can one so easily, however, simply identify a
concern for elements of origin, like ethnicity and nationality,
with reactionary politics in the present situation? This is the
primary question of this paper.
The fact is that many of the major political liberation movements around the globe today are struggles precisely for the
rightful place of soil, blood, family, tribe and nation. The Black
majority fighting against apartheid in South Africa, the yearning for self-determination on the part of the minority Native
population in Canada, the determined desire for the preservation of the French language and culture in Quebec, the ArabIsraeli conflict in the Middle East, and Ukrainian nationalism
in the Soviet Union, to name but a few examples, all point to
the significant role which the powers of origin play in the contemporary struggle for historical freedom and justice around

—
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What

the present global political situation demonstrates is that a diversity of national and cultural-religious
groups are perceiving the political imperative (the ought or
the globe.

whereto of human existence) to be not the breaking, let alone
the dissolution, of the powers of origin, but rather the very
opposite; that is, the full realization of those aspects of life
connected with origin.
What I want to propose is that the powers of the origin
that is, those dimensions of human existence which root us in
nature are in fact defining characteristics of what it means to
exist as human creatures, both as individuals and as groups.
It is that which ties us to nature and to fellow human beings
and, therefore, to be taken with utmost seriousness in an age
of technical reason which uproots us from our origins. Further,
I want to argue that the root cause of injustice in the present
historical moment is not the affirmation of our various myths
of origin per se but rather domination by one configuration of
the powers of the origin over another. In short, the political
ought has to do not with the breaking or overcoming of nationality or ethnicity in themselves, for instance, but with the
breaking of the domination by one nationality over another.
Justice, therefore, has to do not with the ignoring of the myth
of the origin, which is fated to be unsuccessful from the start,
but with limiting the powers of origin to their rightful place.
The issue, as I see it, consequently, is not whether or not the
myths of origin are to be affirmed in a significant sense contemporary injustice is a turning against and the suppression of
the legitimate yearnings of groups for their cultural and ethnic
but, rather, the relation of particular
places under the sun

—

—

—

and naon the one hand, and to the universal,
international, cosmopolitan human community, on the other.
It seems to me, for instance, that Canadian society is an excellent example of a country in which the right balance between 1)
a universal federal identity, and 2) the legitimate claims of various nationalities and regional, cultural-ethnic configurations,
is still being forged.
I want to use Paul Tillich’s analysis of nation and the myth
cultural constellations (including language, ethnicity

tionality) to each other,

of origin (as contained in his

defense of

my

German

writings up to 1933) in

position. Tillich has frequently been perceived,

especially in light of his

own

conflict with National Socialism
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and subsequent exile to New York City in 1933, as being unambiguously opposed to the national myth of origin in favor
of the socialist principle of universal

human

solidarity, repre-

sented by the international proletariat. Such a view

is based on
a superficial reading of Tillich. There is in all of Tillich’s writings during his German period, an underlying romanticism and
even mysticism, exemplified, for instance, in his view of theonomy as the presence of the Unconditioned in human culture,
his notion of God as the ground of being, his definition of religion as the substance of culture and culture as the form of

understanding of good art as expressing the
which took the form of Religious Socialism in which he attempted to bridge the world of
Protestant Christianity and a Marxist analysis of society beginning immediately after World War I, is quite well known
and will not be discussed at length in this paper.
What is often ignored, however, is the important role which
various romantic aspects of the myth of origin played in his
socialist thought. ^ His fundamental critique of the bourgeois
principle as well as the doctrinaire socialist principle, which he
says ultimately grows out of the bourgeois principle, is that it
has lost the religious and sacramental substance and replaced
it with pure rational form.
This critique of socialism is most
clearly seen in his by now famous 1933 book The Socialist
Decision^ which too often is read simply as a resounding condemnation of nationalism and National Socialism. In fact, it
was seen by some as giving much too significant a place to soil,
blood and nation, even though it was quickly confiscated by
the Nazis. It is to a few of Tillich’s relevant writings, including his The Socialist Decision^ that I now turn for help in the
religion,

and

his

infinite. Tillich’s radical politics,

I see it. My own position is quite close
think the historical situation, especially
in regard to contemporary national liberation movements, has
changed sufficiently to make Tillich’s conclusions incomplete.

analysis of the issue as

to Tillich’s although

I

Christianity, Socialism

and Nationalism, 1924

In a 1924 article, “Christentum, Sozialismus

und Nation-

alismus,” Tillich protests against certain nationalistic views
recently defended by the conservative Wingolf student orga-

nization of which he himself had earlier been a

member.^ He
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objects particularly to the Wingolf’s uncritical identification
of historical Protestant Christianity with

morality, especially nationality,

German bourgeois

and warns that any such un-

mediated identification with German culture is a falling back
and idolatry. What is
interesting in this 1924 essay, however, is that, although he
unambiguously espouses political socialism, he, nevertheless,
leaves positive room for family, Volk (the nation) and Stand
(station in life). In what sense he does this will become clear
below. The most important thing to remember about Tillich,
however, is that any residues of the myth of origin that remain in his thought are incorporated into his socialist vision
into “pre-Christian national religion”

for society.

After distinguishing three different concepts, which according to Tillich are often confused in the popular mind
social,
socialism, and Marxism
he comes to the strong defense of
political socialism and Marxism. Political socialism must, he
says, be distinguished from the social conscience of capitalism
and be seen as a commitment to the radical political transformation of the capitalistic social order. Marxism is the theoretical basis for such a transformation and consists of three
basic elements: 1) it is a philosophy of history and economic
doctrine which stands over against classical English economic
theory and both continues and restructures the German idealistic philosophy of history; 2) it is a profound new analysis
of the relationship between spiritual-religious values and the
sociological and economic basis of society; and 3) it provides
invaluable insight into the dialectical conflict-character and inner rationality of historical development. Tillich is a committed socialist and Marxist in all of these senses.
The problem, for Tillich, is that bourgeois materialism
which descended upon the masses in the nineteenth century
also corrupted this great Marxist vision and turned it into a
materialistic Marxism which, according to Tillich, spelled the
spiritual death of socialism. The bourgeois spirit which has its
most explicit manifestation in the capitalistic social order, but

—

—

which is unfortunately also evident in vulgar Marxism, empties
corporate reality of all spiritual substance, reifies the relationship of human beings to each other and to things, splits apart
spiritual, social and economic life into subject and object, destroys all immediate communal relationships, and attacks natural and spiritual realities such as family, Volk (nationality)

Paul Tillich
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the great losers in

from

through the formal rationalization of all
for the working class
are
all of this since they are thereby excluded

(station),

—

The masses— Tillich's term

all

spiritual goods.

became the key theopost-World War One Germany, had as its aim precisely making the working class aware of this loss of spiritual
substance and calling socialism back to the concerns of early
Marx. Here Tillich makes a most provocative point. Religious
Religious Socialism, of which Tillich

retician in

Socialism, he says,

is

committed

to the struggle against the de-

structive despiritualizing effects of capitalism on the spirit and
life of the nation and the nations. It is this which binds it not
only to political socialism but also to what he calls “religiouslygrounded national movements,” even though in the end Reli-

gious Socialism cannot join these national renewal

movements

because they do not go to the root of the evil. They continue,
without wanting to, to support the basic capitalistic attitude.

What becomes

clear in this early essay

is

that Tillich, while

he clearly opts for political socialism and Marxism, still resome ambivalence tow^ard national renewal movements,
because it is these movements which correctly perceive the

tains

something valuable; namely, the
and mythical substance of the individual
and corporate human existence. Genuine socialism, historically carried by the proletariat, if it is to survive, will need to
recover its spiritual ground and ties to the dynamic structures
of being and life. What he is rejecting in this essay is not the
Wingolf student organization's legitimate concern for the nation as such, but the uncritical identification of Ghristianity
with a particular nation. Tillich felt that both the Religious
Socialists and the Wingolf supporters of national renewal ought
to have this in common with each other; that they subject their
own causes and worldviews to the cross and the judgment of
loss in capitalistic society of

loss of the irrational

the eternal.

Political

What

Romanticism, 1932-33

all of this becomes clearer in
which he published in 1932 and 1933, in the context of the triumph of National Socialism and the Third Reich:
“Protestantismus und Politische Romantik [1932],” and “Das

two

exactly Tillich means in

articles
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Wohnen, Der

Raum und

die Zeit [1933].”

ing behind Tillich’s political theory

is

The

idealistic think-

particularly evident in

first of these articles, “Protestantismus und Politische Romantik.” He begins by distinguishing between two aspects of
being human: creatureliness and humanness, two poles which
he says are always present. The first is directed to the “wherefrom ( ITo/ier)” or origin of human existence. Human beings
know themselves to be carried by a ground [tragenden Grund).
The power of the origin expresses itself here as Boden (ground),
blood and social group. It is what Tillich sometimes refers to
as the priestly-sacramental dimension of human existence. Its
trademark is the concern for space.
The second is directed to the “whereto ( Wozuy^ of existence
in which human beings perceive themselves as subject to a demand, or an ought, as being directed toward a goal ( Telos). He
sometimes refers to this second aspect or direction of human
existence as the prophetic-eschatological dimension, in which
time triumphs over space. The important point here is that,
although Tillich clearly subordinates the priestly-sacramental
dimension to the prophetic-eschatological one, he, nevertheless, considers the former absolutely essential for meaningful
human existence. “Both moments,” he maintains, “are active
in every moment of human existence. We always stand within
the origin, and we always have to tear ourselves away from

the

it.”^

According to Tillich, there are two ways in which these
powers of the origin are broken: through the prophetic and
humanistic impulses. The prophetic places the “is” of human
existence under the judgment of the ethical “ought,” the “anticipation of coming righteousness.”^ It does this still, however,
within a mythical framework. While transcendence remains it
is now not the holy transcendence of the origin but the transcendence of the future. It is with an Enlightenment-shaped
humanism that the mythical is completely overcome on the
basis of human autonomy. Human beings now see themselves
as on their own. They take into their own hands the structuring of the world, they critically and analytically define and
determine their own destiny. Even the ethical ought now loses
its otherworldly character and is directed simply to progressive
analysis and restructuring of the world. The rational system
of bourgeois society replaces the older mythical worldview.
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It is in the light of this theoretical and historical analysis
that Tillich now proceeds to his political theory, to a discus-

sion of political romanticism.

“Political romanticism,”

says

attempt to return to the myth of origin on the
basis of a broken myth of origin.”^ It is the attempt to recover once again the powers of the origin without giving up
Enlightenment autonomy. This is the inner contradiction of
political romanticism; namely, that it wants to use the tools of
the Enlightenment to recover that which has been broken by
the Enlightenment.
There are, however, two forms of political romanticism: the
conservative and the revolutionary. Conservative political romanticism is against anything new and wants simply to sanctify the old. Tillich saw it at his time to be represented by
groups such as the farmers and farm-related craftsmen, the
nobility and the military, the priests and certain segments
of the civil service. Revolutionary political romanticism (into
which category Tillich places National Socialism) is represented
by those groups which have been completely assimilated into
the rational system but still yearn longingly for the powers of
the origin, a remythologization of consciousness. For the petit bourgeoisie and large sections of the myth-of-origin groups
which have been disenfranchized by the economic crisis, political romanticism takes on a revolutionary character.
What is significant in this latter group is that for them the
rational system has triumphed and broken tradition. TechnoTillich, “is the

logical reason

As soon

is

affirmed, however, only as long as

it is

useful.

becomes manifest and
threatens to produce a proletariat, this group rejects the rational system in favor of the myth of origin. According to Tillich’s
as the underside of capitalism

analysis, the strength of political romanticism rests in
nition of the truth that being

its

recog-

human always depends on being

carried by a ground. This awareness and the yearning for the

myth of origin as this ground becomes especially powerful at
a time when the rational system is obviously in a state of crisis and autonomy has become for most an unbearable burden.
The weakness and contradiction within political romanticism
is that it can triumph only through the destruction of the rational system and lead into chaos and reductionism. This is in
fact what Tillich sees as the danger of National Socialism.
Tillich goes on in this essay to discuss how Catholicism and
Protestantism, both in its Lutheran and Calvinist forms, stand
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with respect to political romanticism. This is not the prim.ary
concern of my paper. What I want to show, however, is how,
despite his critique of political romanticism and his defense
of the prophetic and humanistic protest against the myth of
origin, there remains in Tillich an underlying ambivalence toward the myth-of-origin groups. This has to do with his basic
affirmation of the metaphysical, ontological, mystical, or sacra-

human existence especially in
modernity. One might say this is the

mental ground of
the crisis of

all

the face of
“religious”

dimension in his Religious Socialism.
This ontological and mystical element in Tillich’s radical social thought is most remarkably expressed in the second of the
above articles, “Das Wohnen, Der Raum und Die Zeit (Habitation, Space and Time).” All three concepts
Wohnen (to
live in a house, to have a home), space, and time, are given
positive value, although in the end time is given priority; that
is, according to Tillich, space must give way to time. Space has
no abstract meaning but must be understood in its concrete
diversity as it relates to inanimate objects, plants, animals and
human beings. Space for plants, for instance, means something
quite different than it does for inorganic substances. Space for
animals, while concentrated at a specific point has much more
flexible boundaries as an organic growing entity than a house
in which one lives. For the space of animals a new character-^
istic is added; namely, that of movement, a movement which
can conquer and take over foreign space. Here now you have
duality which is not present for plants: the movement away
from the place of origin and a yearning to go back to primal

—

space, the nest or

lair.

For human beings this duality is intensified. Human space,
while maintaining all the previous elements, now has a new
dimension: the duality between the inner and outer space. Externally, human beings can break all boundaries of space and
have the potential for creating limitless or infinite space for
themselves; although they always voluntarily limit themselves
to a particular space. Inwardly, human beings become conscious of the desire to limit themselves to a finite space, the

house and the love of mother and home, on the one hand, and
the desire and need to leave home and mother and create infinite space for themselves. However, to have and create space is
the way everything that lives combes into existence and as such

^
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space takes on primal and holy quality, above all that space
which has the character of preservation [der Tragenden)^ the
ground [Boden). One’s own house, the neighbor’s house, village, city, country, and Volk (nation or nationality) all partake
in the sanctity of space which gives us our existence.^ Nevertheless,

the space-creating power of

human

beings

is

also directed

toward transforming the whole earth into a house for all of
humanity. This is how space is related to time.
Time can never annul space. In fact, time becomes present
for us only within space. In “the present” space and time are
united. For Tillich, “Whoever has space has the present; the
person who has not yet found space remains without space-forlives toward the future, in order to create
life [Lebensraum]
for himself the present out of that future.”^ We have again
and again to forsake space for the sake of the future. Abraham
was called to leave his life-space [Lehensraum] to go into an unknown future and thus, according to Tillich, becomes a symbol
for all of humankind. This is an especially important symbol
during the present social struggle, says Tillich in 1933, when
the gods and powers of limited and enclosed space resist breaking out into all-comprehensive space, the space of humankind.
As is evident throughout this essay, Tillich is here not rejecting
the importance of space as such, which is essential for meaningful human existence, but protests against that absolutization
of finite space which struggles against time and infinite space
for all of humankind. What is noteworthy, nevertheless, is how
much weight Tillich does put on the importance of Wohnen
and concrete particular space or Lebensraum for human existence.

The

Socialist Decision, 1933

How

does Tillich apply all of this abstract analysis to a connamely, the so-called liberation of the German
nation under Hitler and National Socialism? First of all, it
must be said unhesitatingly that Tillich earlier than most recognized and roundly condemned the demonic and pagan nationalism within National Socialism. This is evident even before Hitler came to power (January 30, 1933). In a 1932 essay,
“Die Kirchen und das Dritte Reich: Zehn Thesen,”!^ Tillich in
ten theses warns the Protestant churches in Germany against
crete situation

—
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identifying with and supporting the National Socialist Party
suppression of socialism (theses nos. 1 and 10); against

in its

and the ideology of blood and race on
the basis of a divine order of creation and thus giving up the
Protestant prophetic principle in favor of a new heathenism
(thesis no. 3); and against giving divinely-ordained authority
to the capitalistic-feudal forms of lordship which serve to support National Socialism, thus prolonging the class struggle and
betraying the Protestant task of witnessing for justice (thesis

justifying nationalism

no. 4).
Tillich’s

condemnation of paganism within National Socialism and his challenge to the Protestant churches is crystal clear.
Protestantism must preserve its prophetic-Christian character
by setting the Christianity of the cross over against the heathenism of the swastika. It must witness to the breaking of
the sanctity of nation, race, blood and authoritarianism, and
place them under the judgment of the cross. What must be
remembered here, however, is that when Tillich uses the term
“breaking” he does not mean the dissolution of these aspects
of the origin but rather their relativization. Even in this article
of ten theses, there is a strange hidden ambivalence which is
implicit in theses nos. 8 and 9. In thesis no. 8 he maintains
that Protestantism cannot identify itself with any definite political

direction and, consequently,

freedom to belong to any

must allow

its

members

the

even those which fight
against Protestantism in its ecclesiastical form. It must, nevertheless, place every party, and all human activity under the
judgment and hope of the prophetic early Christian proclamation of the kingdom of God. In this way, Tillich continues in
thesis no. 9, Protestantism can point those groups who support
National Socialism to the true goal and free the movement from
the national- and human-destroying demons that now control
political party,

it.

most important political statement, his famous book
of 1933, The Socialist Decision^ Tillich goes much further in his
analysis of the two roots of all political thought, ideas which
are already present in his earlier writings, some of which we
have discussed above. The first root is “The consciousness
In his

oriented to the

myth

and romantic thought

of origin... the root of all conservative

This root has to do with
in politics.”
the cyclical law of birth, development and death from which
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none of us can
of the

myth

finally escape.

The second

root

is

“The breaking

of origin by the unconditional demand... the root

and socialist thought in politics.” ^2
What is truly remarkable about this book, especially in the
light of the political context in which it was written and first
appeared that is, during the time that saw the triumph of
is how far Tillich goes in acknowledging
National Socialism
the importance of the powers of origin for human existence.
“The origin is creative,” he says, “... we are continually dependent on the origin; it bears us, it creates us anew at every
moment, and thereby holds us fast. The origin brings us forth
as something new and singular, but it takes us, as such back to
Nevertheless, Tillich stresses the ambiguthe origin again.”
the
origin.
This
is what political romanticism does not
ity of
recognize or accept and this is where National Socialism, which
Tillich, as we have seen, identifies with revolutionary political
romanticism, goes wrong. It calls us back to an unambiguous
origin. But human beings experience, or at least ought to experience, themselves not only as bound to the origin but also
as freed from the origin by the moral demand which “calls for
something that does not yet exist but should exist”
justice.
of liberal, democratic,

—

—

—

the “recognition of the equal dignity of the ‘thou’
of the other and of one’s self. Herein lies the
and the ‘F
ambiguity of the origin: that there exists an antinomy between
the actual origin (presumably what Tillich has in mind here is
Justice

home,

soil,

is

blood, tribe, and nation) and the true origin (jus-

the split between being (the is) and the demand for
justice (the ought). This antinomy, however, is not an absolute
tice). It is

one because the true origin
“Justice

is

is

the fulfillment of being; that

the true power of being.”

is,

Further, the relationship

between origin and justice, between being and demand is not a
simple dialectic, for “The demand is superior to the origin.”
What distinguishes the spirit of socialism from the spirit of
political romanticism is that it takes seriously this demand for

something new (justice). Political romanticism in all its forms
does not take seriously the demand for justice but draws “the
spirit back into the bondage of being.”
Tillich’s book deserves a much more careful discussion than
I can give here. His analysis of the principle and inner contradiction of political romanticism; his examination of the bourgeois principle and its attack on all traditional bonds of origin
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through a total objectification and rationalization of society,
that ultimately robs the proletariat of any connection with the
spiritual dimension of its own origin; and his explication, defense, and critique of political socialism in Germany are all
relevant here. Nevertheless, I will limit my final remarks to
a few observations about Tillich’s view of socialism and the
nation.

The nation

a fundamental ingredient of the myth of
not the nation as nation-state but the nation as a
origin
cultural, linguistic, ethnic entity (as in nationality)— and for
Tillich is to be affirmed but never absolutized.
Where the
is

—

myth
is

of origin predominates, a particular space like the nation

idolatrously consecrated ontologically.

tradition

demands

Here the prophetic

that time be elevated above space. This

is

what happens in prophetic Judaism which anticipates a “new
heaven and a new earth,” the new being which is “intrinsically
unontological.”
The Jewish spirit raises time above space in
this way and represents the protest against bondage to space.
“The spirit of Judaism is therefore the necessary and eternal
enemy of political romanticism. ”20 This means, according to
Tillich, that “the actual

tual

life

of every nation,

of the Jewish nation, like the acby nature pagan. ”21

life
is

Although Tillich throughout this book is highly critical of
the absurd way in which National Socialism tries to create a
unified national tradition on the basis of the old-German hersomething which cannot be achieved
itage and mythology22
because of the heterogeneity of the Germanic past and of any
attempt to give the nation mythic significance, he does recognize the power of the nation as both an historical reality and
as a symbol. While the proletariat is ultimately committed to
an international human community, Tillich still maintains that
“The concept of a classless society... does not imply a society
cut off from the power of origin. Even in the society which
socialism wishes to create, the factors of soil, blood, and social group will be present. ”23 Although socialism must protest

—

—

the ideological perversion of the national idea in the defense of
domination and imperialism, “Socialism must affirm the nation more profoundly than nationalism can. ”24 This is what he
says about a socialist view of the nation:
But

it

is

true here, too, that only what once

be misused.

The

had a genuine use can

idea of the nation cannot be destroyed by pointing

Paul Tillich
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The

perversion.

its

idea of the nation has energies deriving from

the origin, and therefore has a claim to fulfillment

— meaning not

uncritical support, but also not destruction. Soil, blood, tradition,

the social group

—

all

the powers of origin are combined in the na-

The prophetic tradition thus relates to a people neither in
such a way as to confirm it in its immediate self-awareness (as the
tion.

“false

prophets” do), nor to dissolve

transition to a universal

humanity

it

for the sake of

(as

an immediate

bourgeois cosmopolitanism

It seeks rather at once to judge and to support the nation.
The prophetic is always addressed to all humanity, but it always proceeds from amongst a people, exhibiting thereby the unity of origin
and goal that is typical of it.^^

does).

What

Tillich

universal

seems to be suggesting here

human community

is

is

that the way to a

through the particular

commu-

one cannot get to the universal community too quickly, without passing through that which is nearest
one’s own family, tribe, and nationality. The problem
to one
arises when one becomes fixated with one’s own particular,
or national community and no longer sees it as a means to a
universal, international human community.
In other words,

nity.

—

Notes
^

This paper
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ment
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recently

political

W. Kohlhammer,

1982).
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^ “Protestantismus
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Politische Romantik,”

Gesammelte Werke, Bd.

(Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1962) 209.
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^ Ibid.

^

“Das Wohnen, der

Raum und

die Zeit,”
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